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(1323) 
TRIBUTE 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., AND THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 
TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF† 
In the field of civil procedure, it is sometimes a struggle to get 
practitioners, judges, and scholars to give history the attention it de-
serves.  In many other fields, the analytical significance of history and 
past practice are well established in our shared professional culture.  
Torts, property, and the other common law subjects, constitutional 
law, international law—in these areas and many others, the evolution 
and growth of legal doctrines over time form an integral part of the 
common understanding of how modern problems should be under-
stood and approached.  The collection of doctrines and institutional 
practices that govern the field of civil procedure are no less shaped by 
their history.  But that history rarely informs present debates.  There 
are a few conspicuous exceptions, the most notable being the doctrine 
of personal jurisdiction, which is usually taught in law schools as an 
historical exercise in legal process and constitutional common law.  
But when it comes to the core doctrines of civil practice and litiga-
tion—preclusion, joinder, discovery, pleadings—discussions often 
proceed as though the world began in the closing decades of the 
twentieth century. 
This state of affairs makes the work of scholars like Geoff Hazard 
acutely important.  Professor Hazard has been at the center of the 
world of procedure for half a century.  By virtue of that fact alone, he 
is well equipped to serve as a living archive of the growth and evolu-
tion of the practice of civil litigation—a role that he acknowledged 
somewhat wryly in an essay twenty years ago when, writing about the 
operation of the Federal Rules on the occasion of their fiftieth anni-
† Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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versary, he began one section by noting, “Remembering as I do how a 
defense could be conducted under old code pleading . . . .”1  From his 
fifteen-year tenure as Director of the American Law Institute, to his 
role as draftsman of model rules on both judicial conduct and profes-
sional conduct for the American Bar Association, to his service as Re-
porter for the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, there are few aspects of 
the analytical and institutional business of litigation over the last fifty 
years that have not been shaped by his hand. 
But the lessons of history go deeper in the work of Geoff Hazard, 
for Professor Hazard has been one of a core group of scholars who 
have emphasized the historical foundations of civil practice as the 
starting point for understanding modern procedure—its shape, its 
content, and its direction.  Nowhere is this commitment more appar-
ent than in An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, the 
magisterial account of the historical origins of the modern class action 
that Hazard wrote with John Gedid and Stephen Sowle.2  As one of its 
central themes, Binding Effect disaggregates two ideas that are often 
taken to be inevitably linked in modern class action doctrine:  (1) the 
propriety, at the outset, of certifying a proceeding that will allow a 
small number of representatives to litigate claims on behalf of a class 
of similarly situated individuals; and (2) the binding effect that such a 
proceeding will have upon the members of the class when the suit ar-
rives at a judgment.3  Through a careful study of the origins of repre-
sentative proceedings in English and American equity practice, Ha-
zard and his coauthors demonstrate that the policies of joinder that 
characterize the first question have a provenance and an evolutionary 
path distinct from the policies of preclusion and judgments law that 
characterize the second.  Efforts to merge the two policies over the 
years, they show, have never been harmonious.  Hazard and his co-
authors thus challenge the notion that a court’s choices in construct-
ing a class proceeding ex ante will reliably determine the binding ef-
fect that the judgment will have ex post.  In so doing, they free mod-
ern thinkers to ask more careful and targeted questions about the 
permissible and desirable boundaries of a representative proceeding, 
1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2242 (1989). 
2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of 
the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998). 
3 See, e.g., id. at 1857 (“Our historical study of the precedents reveals that courts 
have never unequivocally committed themselves to a set of ex-ante procedures that will 
assure ex-post that the judgment will bind the members of the class in the same way as 
if the class members had been individually made parties.”) 
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unhampered by assumptions concerning the necessary forms of the 
class action.  For scholars who have attempted to think through the 
relationship between preclusion policy and class litigation, the article 
is an indispensable reference.4 
That type of effort—to identify the structural features that charac-
terize current doctrine and to challenge the assumption that those 
structures are either analytically necessary or historically mandated—is 
one of the greatest services that a proceduralist can perform for the 
profession.  Institutional memories can be short, and investment in the 
familiar (path dependence, as it has come to be called) can be a pow-
erful inertial force in conversations about reform.  When scholars can 
demonstrate which features of current doctrine are the result of con-
scious and considered trade-offs between competing values and which 
are merely vestigial holdovers or the product of outright misconcep-
tion, courts and reformers can make more informed judgments. 
Take, for example, the question of when a collateral attack might 
be available to absentees wishing to escape the binding effects of a 
class action judgment.  This contentious issue has provoked intense 
disagreement among scholars and judges in recent years, producing a 
proliferation of highly theorized responses but no satisfying solution.5  
The debate has taken shape around an assumption that the Supreme 
Court voiced in its only recent statement on the issue, in Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, that “a judgment entered in a class ac-
tion, like any other judgment entered in a state judicial proceeding, is 
4 My own work in this field stands on Hazard’s scholarly shoulders.  See Tobias 
Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005). 
5 See, e.g., Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257-58 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(permitting collateral attack of a class action settlement because there was “no prior 
adequacy of representation determination with respect to individuals whose claims 
[arose] after the depletion of the settlement fund”), aff’d in part by an equally divided 
Court, vacated in part on other grounds, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (per curiam); Epstein v. 
MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235, 1237-38, 1242-45 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing a broad right 
to collaterally attack a class action judgment in which a state court proceeding ap-
proved a settlement releasing exclusively federal claims), vacated, 179 F.3d 641, 647-50 
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that collateral attack is not available when the initial class 
proceedings employed minimally adequate procedures); Marcel Kahan & Linda Sil-
berman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions:  A Critique of Epstein v. 
MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1998) (criticizing a broad right to collateral attack).  
My contribution to the debate over this issue has been a modest one.  See Tobias Bar-
rington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2117-31 (2008) (offering a systemic case for the availability of 
some collateral attacks, when class action procedures foreclose other avenues by which 
the interests of absent class members might be protected). 
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presumptively entitled to full faith and credit.”6  As Professor Hazard 
and his coauthors trenchantly point out, the Court offered that con-
testable assumption as the culmination of a long period of equivoca-
tion about the binding effects of class or representative proceedings.7  
At the very least, the proposition that a class action judgment (or set-
tlement) should be treated “like any other judgment entered in a state 
judicial proceeding” requires analytical justification rather than mere 
citation to precedent.  Had the Court’s intervention on the collateral 
attack issue in Matsushita enjoyed the benefit of Hazard’s work, the 
current debate might be more focused and productive. 
Efforts at institutional reform often suffer from the same lack of 
perspective.  The current reexamination of pleading standards in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s revolutionary decisions in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly8 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal 9 provides a salient example.  
Those rulings have provoked an intense debate over the level of factual 
specificity and evidentiary support that a plaintiff should be required 
to demonstrate in a complaint before she is permitted to mobilize the 
powerful tools of discovery (and thereby secure a more advantageous 
posture for settlement).  Thus far, that debate has consisted largely of a 
back-and-forth discussion about the exigencies of the current civil liti-
gation system, with a particular emphasis on the burdensome costs of 
documentary and electronic discovery.  Many proposed solutions 
would entail a significant restructuring of the obligations and expecta-
tions associated with pleading, and data regarding the likely impact of 
such changes are often elusive.  Past experience with efforts to accom-
plish reform through substantive pleading standards could help teach 
us what sort of data we should be trying to collect, but serious discus-
sion of such earlier efforts has thus far been muted. 
Professor Hazard’s expertise on the history of pleading practice is 
well known, and it should come as no surprise that his scholarly cor-
pus already offers a perspective on these pressing issues.  Over twenty 
years ago, Hazard wrote several essays to commemorate the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In one, he de-
scribed the formal and practical changes to the civil action that the 
Rules had brought about and then examined the devices by which 
certain elements of the old forms of action had found their way back 
6 516 U.S. 367, 374 (1996). 
7 See Hazard, Gedid & Sowle, supra note 2, at 1849. 
8 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
9 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
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into modern civil practice.10  In describing the Rules’ revolutionary re-
jection of fact pleading under the Field Code, Hazard offered an ob-
servation that should serve as the starting point for appreciating the 
magnitude of the current debate: 
 In an era in which we have become conditioned to broad discovery, it 
is difficult to fully appreciate the effect of having to rely entirely on one’s 
own evidentiary resources to establish a claim.  In yesteryear, an ag-
grieved person who did not observe the act that resulted in injury, or 
have documentary evidence to prove it, was dependent upon the volun-
tary cooperation of third party witnesses and the possibility of inculpat-
ing extrajudicial admissions by the opposing party. . . . A claimant could 
get to trial only by filing a claim that could be prosecuted, and doing 
that in turn required being able to formulate a proper complaint.  A 
properly formulated Field Code complaint had to state the particulars of 
the defendant’s acts that caused the injury, and the plaintiff had to know 
those particulars in order to plead them.  The contrast with Federal 
Rules procedure is difficult to exaggerate.
11
 
With the Twombly and Iqbal rulings, yesteryear has returned.  As of this 
writing, Professor Hazard has not weighed in publicly on the debate 
about what is to be done with pleading standards in their wake.  When 
he does, we will all benefit from the breadth of his knowledge. 
As the saying goes, Geoff Hazard has forgotten more about the 
history of civil practice and procedure than most of us will ever learn.  
For decades, he has sat at the center of key debates over procedural 
reform.  As both a student of history and a living embodiment of his-
tory’s progress, he reminds us of how much knowledge we must at-
tempt to hold within our grasp in order to do this work well. 
 
10 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forms of Action Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628 (1988). 
11 Id. at 633 (footnote omitted). 
